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Abstract
In this paper, we try to understand the nature of the changes to Mexican macroeconomic
policy in the early 1980s using a critical juncture framework. The framework argues that three
elements - crisis, ideational change, and radical policy change - must be identified in order for us
to be able to declare, with some certainty, whether an event constitutes a critical juncture. Utilizing
this framework, we will ascertain if the changes to Mexican macroeconomic policy constituted a
clean break with the past, or were a continuation of previously established policy pathways.
KEYWORDS: Mexico, economic, crisis, critical, juncture, ideas
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Introduction
It is against the background of our current global economic crisis that we examine
how Mexico responded to its own economic difficulties in the early 1980s. By
the late 1970s, on the surface at least, the future looked bright for Mexico. Its
economy was growing, it had discovered oil and its government was spending
large sums on state projects and enterprises. However, within a few short years
circumstances changed dramatically, leading to a deep questioning of extant
macroeconomic policy. Did policy change? What form did this change assume?
And what lessons might policy makers today take from this episode?
Sudden policy changes are often blamed on crises of a variety of kinds.
We will see the current global economic crisis held up as responsible for the
various policy changes that come in its wake. Such crises are regarded as
affording politicians the chance to implement new strategies in direct response.
This has resulted in an inclination amongst commentators to readily connect
economic crises with radical policy changes and deem them to constitute cause
and effect. However, here we contend that such linkage is an oversimplification
of a far more complex process. It fails to take account of the political
circumstances within individual jurisdictions or the idea that economic crises are
a necessary, but insufficient, condition for radical policy changes – often such
crises are followed simply by policy continuity.
In exploring this issue, we employ the critical juncture framework
developed by Hogan and Doyle (2007). According to the framework, a critical
juncture consists of three discreet, but interconnected, elements: crisis, ideational
change (extant ideational collapse and new ideational consolidation), and radical
policy change (see Figure 1).
Ideational Change
Crisis

+

Extant
Ideational
Collapse

+

New Ideational
Consolidation

+

Radical
Policy
Change

=

Critical
Juncture

Figure 1. Critical Juncture Framework

The framework’s underlying hypothesis is that a crisis can create the
environment where change agents can contest extant ideas and the policies based
upon them. Replacement of an extant ideational paradigm through the
consolidation of a new set of ideas – as a consequence of a crisis – results in a
radical policy change. According to this framework, the differentiating factor
between crises that result in critical junctures in policies, and those that do not, is
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ideational change. In the absence of ideational change, policy change in response
to a crisis will either be first or second order policy change, but not third order
(paradigmatic) change.1 Policy instrument settings, and the instruments
themselves, may change, but without ideational change the hierarchy of goals
underpinning a policy will remain unaltered. Ideational change constitutes the
variable connecting a crisis and the nature of the subsequent policy change.
Here we will examine whether the economic difficulties affecting Mexico
at the start of the 1980s constituted a crisis; whether there was a subsequent
change in the ideas underlying extant macroeconomic policy; and what exactly
was the nature of the change, if any, to Mexican macroeconomic policy?
Employing the framework provides us with a glimpse into the black box of policy
making and the mechanics of policy change. The framework’s robustness means
it can be applied broadly and in so doing renders the concept of the critical
juncture less nebulous and case specific.

A Brief Overview of the Critical Junctures Literature
According to Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) theory, a critical juncture consists of a
crisis, ideational change and a radical policy change. “Because the decision to
select any particular event as the starting point of analysis may seem arbitrary, the
investigator is prone to keep reaching back in their search for the foundational
causes” (Mahoney 2000, 527). The crucial object is one that sets development
along a particular path, the trigger event (Pierson 2004). Periods of policy genesis
correspond to critical junctures (Abbott 1997). Mahoney (2001) regards critical
junctures as responsible for the implementation of a specific policy arrangement
from among a range of choices. The policy pathway then established works to
funnel subsequent policies in a particular direction (Pierson and Skocpol 2002).
Comparative and single case studies of various types of change have
employed the concept of critical junctures. For some authors, critical junctures
are marked by period of swift change, while for others they take place over a
much longer period. On the issue of swift change, Garrett and Lange (1995)
showed how elections could result in critical junctures by producing
overwhelming mandates for policy change. The concept was used to examine
transitions from authoritarian regimes by Casper and Taylor (1996), while Hogan
and Doyle’s (2007) remoulded framework was used to examine changes in
macroeconomic policy in Sweden and the US in a comparative historical context.
Critical junctures have also been used to examine the differences between Danish
politicians’ and citizens’ attitudes towards the European Union (EU) (Flockhart
1

Here the model borrows from Hall’s (1993) concept of first, second and third order change.
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2005). In relation to long term change, Collier and Collier (1991) and Mahoney
(2001), in their analyses of regime change and trade union movement
development in Latin and Central America, used critical juncture frameworks.
For these authors, critical junctures took place over many decades. Akin to path
dependence, the critical junctures approach highlights the importance of the past
in explaining the present.

Operationalizing the Critical Junctures Framework
In this paper, we examine changes in Mexican macroeconomic policy in the early
1980s in three stages, employing a variation upon Hogan and Doyle’s (2007)
critical juncture framework. Three discrete sets of observable implications are
developed to test for economic crisis, ideational change, and the nature of policy
change.
The existence of a crisis means extant policies cannot be maintained
without a general worsening of the current situation (Boin et al. 2005). A crisis
could be a war, a revolution, or an economic catastrophe – anything that produces
a mandate for policy change. In this case, we will test for an economic crisis, as
there is a longstanding debate in the literature on the relationship between
economic crises and policy change (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). Such an event
raises serious questions about existing policy, and can unleash powerful forces for
change in a country that can have a wide-ranging and long lasting impact
(Haggard 2003). An economic crisis, therefore, can influence policy preferences
(Stevenson 2001).
Ideational change can result in a transformed policy environment, but
understanding how ideas influence policy making is something theorists have
long grappled with (Pemberton 2000; Taylor 1993). To address the question of
why ideas underlying failing policies sometimes change, resulting in policy
change, whereas at other times they remain unaltered, we look to Legro’s (2000)
work on the concepts of extant ideational collapse and new ideational
consolidation.
The nature of the subsequent policy change is identified using Hall’s
(1993) concepts of first, second and third order change. These orders of policy
change provide a deeper understanding as to the nuances contained within in the
policy change process, as well as the kind of change that is necessary for there to
be a critical juncture.

3
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Identifying a Macroeconomic Crisis
Identifying a macroeconomic crisis is difficult, as it is a rare and often country
specific event. Nevertheless, even events such as these must be made quantifiable,
to some extent at least. Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2003) suggest examination
of individual variables when studying a currency crisis. However, Pei and
Adesnik (2000) and Hogan and Doyle (2007) set out a broad range of
qualitative/quantitative criteria for identifying a macroeconomic crisis. General
economic indicators, used in conjunction with perceptions of economic
performance, can help identify a macroeconomic crisis (Garuba 2006; Kwon
2001). Thus, economic crises have been previously studied using various
combinations of subjective and objective criteria. The observable implications
employed in this analysis draw upon the criteria developed in the works discussed
above.
The economy may have been in crisis if:
O1. GDP growth was stagnant or negative,
O2. Debt as a percentage of GNI was above 100 percent,
O3. Inflation was above 15 percent,
O4. The interest rate was above 15 percent,
O5. Unemployment was above 15 percent,
O6. Opinion polls found the public regarded the economic to be in
crisis,
O7. The national media regarded the economy to be in crisis,
O8. Economic and political commentators regarded the economy
to in crisis,
O9. The central bank regarded the economy to be in crisis,
O10. Domestic and international organisations monitoring
economic performance regarded the economy to be in
crisis,
O11. Elected representatives regarded the economy to be in crisis,
and
O12. Government pronouncements on the economy were
consistent with a crisis management approach.
Identifying Ideational Change (Collapse and Consolidation)
An economic crisis can result in the questioning of extant economic policy by
society. However, the crisis on its own will not dictate the evolution of economic
policy, this being determined by political and ideational processes responding to
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the crisis (Golob 2003). Blyth (2002) contends that ideas facilitate the building of
coalitions among agents intent upon resolving a crisis. In this respect, ideas
constitute the mechanisms of policy change in a critical juncture (Golob 2003).
Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) framework argues that for a radical change in policy to
take place, it is necessary that actors consolidate around a particular set of new
ideas that they have reached consensus upon. The framework locates ideational
change at the crossroads of crisis and policy change, determining the type of
policy change that occurs in response to the crisis.
If we want to fully understand policy change, it is necessary to take
account of the work actors do to produce that change (Zittoun 2009). Hogan and
Doyle (2007) argue that three types of change agents are responsible for
introducing ideas into the policy making environment: outside influencers, policy
entrepreneurs and political entrepreneurs. These change agents can act as either
motors for change or hindrances to change (Hogan and Doyle 2007). In this
manner, the critical juncture theory formalizes and captures Kleistra and Mayer’s
(2001) ideas of carriers and barriers to policy change. Thus, the theory accepts
Capano’s (2009) contention that stability and change are connected at both
theoretical and empirical levels.
Outside influencers consist of various print, electronic and online media,
and international organisations such as the Organisation for Economic
cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). They often advocate new economic paradigms while critiquing the extant
ones. Policy entrepreneurs may be academics, economists, commentators, civil
servants, pressure groups or others. Crucially, policy entrepreneurs tend to seek
access to policy makers in their effort to have their voices heard (Kingdon 1995).
The most important group of change agents are what Dahl (1961) calls political
entrepreneurs. These are the actors, whether in government or the opposition, with
the capacity to utilise the instability of a crisis and the new ideas put forward by
outside influencers and policy entrepreneurs in their efforts to bring about policy
change (Sheingate 2003). The political entrepreneurs introduce new ideas into the
policy making process.
Ideational Collapse. If change agents agree that the extant ideational paradigm is
inadequate, and should be replaced, then ideational collapse has occurred. Extant
ideational collapse is the first stage in Legro’s (2000) two-stage model of
ideational change. The observable implications for identifying ideational collapse
are:
O1. Media critique the current policy paradigm and propose
alternative ideas,
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O2. International organisations critique the current policy
paradigm and propose alternative ideas,
O3. There is widespread public dissatisfaction with the current
policy paradigm, observable through opinion polls, protests
etc.,
O4. Academics, economists and civil servants (policy
entrepreneurs) critique the current policy paradigm and
propose alternative ideas,
O5. Civil society organizations such as the labour unions,
employer organizations and consumer groups (policy
entrepreneurs) critique the current policy paradigm and
propose alternative ideas, and
O6. Opposition political parties (political entrepreneurs) critique
the current policy paradigm and propose alternative ideas.
New Ideational Consolidation. Agents must diagnose, and impose on others, their
notion of a crisis before collective action to resolve the uncertainty can begin
(Blyth 2002). Once extant ideational collapse has occurred change agents will
offer solutions. Legro (2000) warns that if they fail to reach consensus on a
replacement idea, continuity could result, as society has a tendency to re-embrace
the extant paradigm. However, if change agents, led by a political entrepreneur,
reach consensus on a replacement idea, it constitutes the second stage of Lergo’s
(2000) model – consolidation (Sheingate 2003). Observable implications include:
O7. Clear alternative ideas developed by policy entrepreneurs,
O8. Political entrepreneur combines interests to produce consensus
around replacement paradigm, and
O9. Political entrepreneur injects new ideas into the policy making
arena.
Consensus on the new ideas will protect the policies derived from them.
Continuity results from protected ideas, as institutionally embedded ideas ensure
that “policy-making becomes possible only in terms of these ideas” (Blyth 2001,
4). In this manner, the critical juncture theory seeks to address Mintrom and
Norman’s (2009, 650) question “by what means can advocates of policy change
come to have broad influence?”
Identifying the Degree of Policy Change
Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) theory argues that once change agents, led by a
political entrepreneur, consolidate around a new set of policy ideas, radical policy
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change should follow. The theory recognises ideas as capable of altering the
policy environment (McNamara 1998). Ideational change is seen as the
differentiating factor between crises that result in radical policy change and those
that do not.
To discover if a radical change in policy followed ideational change, we
use observable implications based upon Hall’s (1993) concepts of first, second,
and third order policy change. He defines third order changes in policies as radical
transformations, with first and second order changes being of lesser magnitude.
These observables will enable us to identify, and differentiate, normal and
fundamental shifts in macroeconomic policy.
For Hall (1993), extant paradigms can be discredited by their failures and
exogenous shocks, leading to a re-examination of extant policy – a paradigmatic
shift. These observables also incorporate the ideas of swift and enduring change;
it cannot be a long process of incremental adjustment and it should survive at least
one change of government – otherwise how can it be a transformative event?
Capano and Howlett (2009) point out that clarifying when a policy change can be
regarded as fundamental, and the length of time it takes to observe such a change,
is usually based on a multi-year perspective to identify actual, as opposed to
temporary, policy alterations. Selecting swift change, that survives a
government’s terms of office, addresses the problems of defining and
operationalizing the timing and scope of policy change (Howlett 2009).
The following observable implications indicate that there may have been a
radical change in economic policy if:
O1. Economic policy instrument settings changed (swiftly and for
longer than a government’s term of office),
O2. The instruments of economic policy changed (swiftly and for
longer than a government’s term of office), and
O3. The hierarchy of goals behind economic policy changed
(swiftly and for longer than a government’s term of office).
The degree of policy change identified will determine if there has been a critical
juncture.
Evaluating the Empirical/Theoretical Fit
The criteria of strong evidence (SE), medium evidence (ME), weak evidence
(WE) and no evidence (NE) will be used here to assess our findings in relation to
the observable implications. Coding, using predetermined criteria of this nature, is
designed to ensure that our findings can be arranged and analyzed coherently
(Maxwell 2005). The more evidence that points towards a crisis, ideational
change and third order policy change, the more confidence we can have that a
7
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critical juncture occurred. This coding allows for a more nuanced understanding
of the criteria contributing to a critical juncture. As interpretation of the codes
employed is crucial in divining meaning from them, the reporting of findings, in
the interest of clarity, usually involves thick description of the categories and their
contexts (Geertz 1973; Polgar and Thomas 2008).

Examining Changes in Mexico’s Macroeconomic Policy
Using the critical juncture framework as set out above, we can now examine the
changes to Mexico’s macroeconomic policy in the early 1980s. In three distinct
stages we will test for an economic crisis, ideational change and finally the nature
of the policy change that occurred in Mexico. This will enable us determine if the
changes to Mexican macroeconomic policy during this time constituted a critical
juncture – a sharp break with the past, or were in fact a continuation of previously
established policies.
Stage 1: Testing for a Macroeconomic Crisis
In an effort to increase Mexico’s international trade, while decreasing its foreign
dependence, the country adopted an import substitution policy after the Second
World War (Narula 2002). The development of domestic industries took place
behind trade barriers (González 2002; Solis 1971). However, as the internal
market was closed off to foreign competition, competitiveness was not crucial for
Mexican industries (Hernandez 2010). Despite this, the model appeared
successful, as there was a strong demand for Mexican raw materials as the global
economy recovered from the ravages of war. Ultimately though, Mexico’s
policies created a private sector with a mercantile mentality – dependent upon
state protection (Hernandez 2010).
During the early 1970s a combination of the first oil crisis and economic
mismanagement by the administration of President Luis Echeverria (1970-1976)
resulted in a recession (Narula 2002). Increased state spending, in an effort to
revive the economy, contributed to inflation and resulted in a rapidly rising
national debt that more than tripled between 1970 and 1976 (Lustig 1992). The
government’s monetary and fiscal indiscipline marked the end of the policy
approach known as “stabilising development.” The reality was that Mexico’s
import substitution economy could not compete with global manufacturers such
as the United States (US), Japan and West Germany. At the same time, there was
growing discontent amongst the middle classes at their inability to influence
policy making in the country’s single party (Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI)) dominated culture (Rubio 2009).
http://www.psocommons.org/rhcpp
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President José López Portillo (1976-1982) came to power facing
significant economic challenges (Alarcon and McKinley 1992). He was not long
in office when the state owned oil giant Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX)
discovered vast reserves under the country’s northern states (Calderón-Madrid
1997). Thereafter, the expectation was that future oil revenues would resolve the
problems in the economy. However, this development permitted extant economic
policies to endure, despite increasing evidence of their failures. In the end, the oil
boom proved temporary, serving only to delay the day of reckoning when the
structural problems in the economy would have to be addressed (Nelson 1990).
This is an example the quick fixes often sought by the Mexican political elite, and
by presidents who, permitted only one term of office, did not have to worry about
the prospect of facing angry voters in a re-election campaign (Tournaud 2008).
As Mexico’s development strategy came to depend upon oil revenues,
demands increased for more public spending. The government’s response was to
increase the number of state owned enterprises by 400 percent (Calderón-Madrid
1997; Clavijo and Valdivieso 2000). As a consequence, state expenditures came
to outpaced petroleum revenues and government’s tax income (Solís 1981). The
rate of inflation rose sharply in the early 1980s as a result of this spending (see
Table 1). At the same time, the value of the peso rose, reducing the competiveness
of exports, apart from oil (McCaughan 1993). This was to have detrimental
consequences for the trade balance (Nash 1991).
By the early 1980s, oil prices fell in response to the diminished demand
following the oil crises of the 1970s, a weakening global economy and a resultant
supply glut (Hershey Jr. 1981). The Mexican economy, with its enduring
structural problems, proved incapable of weathering the challenges presented by
this combination of circumstances. In 1981, PEMEX and the Secretaría de
Programación y Presupuesto (SPP) reported that oil production would not be
sufficient to revive the economy. Foreign borrowing became necessary to sustain
economic expansion. By 1981 Mexico had borrowed $78 billion to fill the chasm
between revenues and expenditures (Alarcon and McKinley 1992). However, as
interest rates increased in the recessionary US, the money supply to Mexico
diminished, while demand for Mexican goods also declined. The higher US
interest rates also placed increased pressure on Mexico’s debt servicing, as US
banks had lent the country some $25 billion. By 1982, the cost of servicing
Mexico’s debt surpassed its oil revenues (Cornelius 1985). The combination of
economic mismanagement, falling oil prices and higher interest rates obliterated
the benefits the economic growth achieved during the 1970s had bestowed (Starr
2006).
Mexicans, having lost confidence in their economy, began converting their
pesos to dollars throughout 1982 (Sancton, Lopez and Ungeheuer 1982). In an
effort to stem the flow of capital from the economy, Banco de Mexico permitted
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the dollar price of the peso to double (Banco de Mexico 1983). However, the
problems in the Mexican economy became clear for all to see on 13 August, 1982,
when:
The government fired the shot heard around the world, announcing
that it could not meet interest payments coming due within the next
few days and initiating negotiations for bridge loans and
rescheduling agreements with the US Treasury, the IMF, and the
private commercial banks (Nelson 1990, 97).
Table 1. Economic Indicators for Mexico (1972 - 1983)

Year

Unemployment
(%)

Inflation
(%)

Interest
(%)

Government
Debt/GNP
Ratio

Growth
Rates in
Real GDP

Gross Capital
Formation (%) of
GDP

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

7
7.3
7.2
7.2
6.7
8.8
6.9
5.7
4.2
4.2
6.8
6.9

5
12.04
23.75
15.15
15.79
29
17.45
18.17
26.36
27.93
58.92
101.7

N/A
N.A
N/A
11.9
11.8
12.9
15.1
16.4
20.7
28.6
40.4
56.7

18.5
19.31
19.73
21.17
27.62
39.18
35.86
32.79
30.53
32.59
53.3
66.53

8.22
7.86
5.78
5.74
4.42
3.38
8.96
9.69
9.22
8.77
-0.63
-4.2

20.32
21.39
23.18
23.69
22.29
22.84
23.6
25.95
25.73
25.94
21.56
19.77

Sources: Data Gob (2011); Fleck and Sorrentino (1994); Mitchell (2007); UNdata (2011)

In 1982, the economic indicators for Mexico pointed towards a crisis
(Dornbusch and Edwards 1991). As we can see from Table 1, GDP declined by
0.6 percent in 1982 and a staggering 4.2 percent the following year, while the rate
of inflation reached 58.92 percent in 1982 and 101.7 percent in 1983. At the same
time, interest rates, which had hovered between 30 and 40 percent up to 1981,
jumped above 50 percent in 1982 and reached a phenomenal 66.53 percent in
1983. Unemployment jumped towards 7 percent, while more than half the
workforce, 20 million people, were underemployed (Cornelius 1985). The
country’s budget deficit had reached an unsustainable 16.5 percent of GDP
(Russell, Bolte and Lopez 1982, 30). Output was down in all industries; auto
production declined by a fifth, minerals by a tenth, and agricultural output was
also down by a fifth (Russell, Bolte and Lopez 1982). US banks stopped
providing loans to Mexican companies, as they already owed over $600 million in
interest (Malkin, Greenwald and Earle 1983).
http://www.psocommons.org/rhcpp
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Mexico appeared to be the country most affected by the global downturn
of the early 1980s (The Economist 1985). In 1983, as unemployment and the
national debt rose, inflation reached triple digits, and the level of capital formation
slackened (Table1). By this point, the country was effectively bankrupt. This was
to prove Mexico’s worst crisis since the Great Depression (Edwards 1995). El
País (1983) placed the blame for the disaster on the policies of President Portillo.
As a consequence, confidence in Mexico’s economy and political elite
evaporated. Some saw the crisis as evidence that Mexico’s traditional political
system was decaying (Russell, Bolte and Lopez 1982).
Minimum wages could not meet the needs of most Mexican families, as
the price of basic foodstuffs rose significantly faster (Lustig 1992). Opinion polls
revealed a populace gravely worried about their economic future (Basañez 1985).
In a desperate move to reduce both speculation against the peso and foreign
investors’ panic, President Portillo opted to nationalise the banks (Warnock
1995).
In an effort to revitalise the export sector, the peso was devalued on two
occasions in 1982 (Katz 1994). However, the economy could not hold onto a
sufficient amount of dollars. To counteract the capital flight, new short term
loans were taken out, but, together with the peso’s devaluation, ultimately this did
nothing to resolve the problem (Jiménez 2006). Banco de Mexico’s reserves were
wiped out in a matter of weeks. Bailey (1988) concludes that the economic
turmoil occurred due to four concurrent trends: oil price fall/excessive
government outlays; $15.3 billion in short-term loans which funded capital flight;
the overvalued peso; and the high level of dollarization in the economy.
Under Portillo, GDP grew at 8 percent annually from 1978 to 1981, one of
the highest levels in the world. However, by the end of 1982 Mexico had run up a
huge national debt, and drastically devalued its currency. President Portillo’s
Sixth Annual Presidential Report sums up the situation by remarking that the
economy was experiencing the worst crisis in its history.2 We can see from Table
2 that, with findings indicating strong evidence for 10 of the 12 observables, there
is strong evidence that the Mexican economy was in crisis during the early 1980s.

2

Sixth Annual Presidential Report of President López Portillo, September 1st, 1982.
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Table 2. The Identification of Macroeconomic Crisis

The Observable Implications
O1. GDP growth stagnant
O2. Debt as a percentage of GNI was above 100%
O3. Inflation above 15%
O4. Interest rate above 15%
O5. Unemployment above 15%
O6. Opinion polls found the public regarded the economic in crisis
O7. Media regarded the economy in crisis
O8. Economic/political commentators regard the economy in crisis
O9. The central bank regard the economy in crisis
O10. Domestic/ international organisations regard the economy in crisis
O11. Elected representatives regard the economy in crisis
O12. Gov pronouncements consistent with a crisis management approach
Economic Crisis

Mexico
1981-1983
SE
NE
SE
SE
NE
SE
SE
SE
SE
SE
SE
SE
SE

The general perception amongst politicians, economic commentators, the
media and the public at large was one of crisis. The economy was stagnant,
inflation and interest rates were very high, the national debt, while not over 100
percent of GNI, was rising rapidly and unemployment, while officially below 10
percent, masked the far higher level of underemployment in the country. Holding
with Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) critical juncture framework, which argues that a
crisis induced consolidation of a new idea – replacing an extant paradigm – will
lead to significant policy change, the next section will examine whether ideas
underlying Mexican economic policies changed at this time of economic crisis.
Stage 2: Testing for Ideational Change
PRI presidents traditionally operated populist-redistributive models (Sandersen
1983). When Portillo assumed office in 1976, he was forced to consider
expenditure reductions due to the economic downturn following the first oil crisis
(Woodhead 1980). However, with the discovery of vast oil reserves, he too was
able to adopt a patronage model that sought to incorporate expansive state
expenditure with rapid industrialisation (Bailey 1980). Initially, this continuation
of the populist approach resulted in high growth rates throughout the late 1970s
(see Table 1), but as the economy grew reliant upon oil revenues it became
increasingly vulnerable to the vagaries of fluctuating oil prices.
Rather than pay the political price that sweeping redistributive
policies-especially tax reform-would have entailed, both the
Echeverria administration (1970-1976) and the Portillo

http://www.psocommons.org/rhcpp
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administration (1976-1982) sought to expand the entire economic
pie and increase the role of the state in the economy, as banker,
entrepreneur, and employer (Cornelius 1985, 88).
Ironically, despite the country’s oil revenue, it became increasingly
dependent on foreign borrowing to meet its expenditure commitments (Prest
1982). Once oil prices fell and interest rates rose, Mexico faced the prospect of
defaulting on its debts. In response, the Portillo administration, in early 1982,
introduced a 12 point plan to stabilise the economy (Taylor and Lopez 1992).
The ideas underlying extant economic policy were coming under increasing
strain.
The economic crisis dominated the 1982 presidential election. The PRI put
forward fiscal conservative Miguel De La Madrid as its candidate (Nelson 1990).
While the mechanics of De La Madrid’s selection were concealed from the
general public, it appears it resulted from shifts in a more conservative direction
within the inner circles of the PRI (Sandersen 1983). The choice of De La Madrid
constituted a rupture from the party’s revolutionary ideology (Cárdenas 2009).
With the economy in crisis, and a sense that the PRI and traditional politics were
failing to meet the challenges confronting the country, free market advocates
demanded a president who would support the rights of private property (Luna,
Tirado and Valdes 1987).
Throughout the campaign, which he ultimately won, De La Madrid
emphasised the differences between his proposed government and the outgoing
Portillo administration. In his inauguration address he declared his opposition to
populism and institutional corruption (Cornelius 1985). He stressed that a new
moral, political and economic approach was needed.3 Locked into the
conditionality of a harsh IMF bailout negotiated by the outgoing administration,
De La Madrid presented a detailed programme for policy change (Golob 2003).
The range of options open to the government was limited. External
financing had dried up in the aftermath of the economic crisis, while oil revenues
remained stagnant (Hernandez 2010). Even when oil prices began to recover,
PEMEX did not have the capacity take advantage of the situation. It was clear that
to maintain economic, political, and social order, a break with the past was
required. Acting as a political entrepreneur, De La Madrid championed a new set
of ideas on how to manage the economy. Change agents, led by De La Madrid,
consolidated around this replacement set of ideas. These involved moving the
Mexican economy away from import substitution, towards a more open approach
to international trade.

3

First Annual Presidential Report of President Miguel De La Madrid, 1 September, 1983.
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We can see from Table 3 that, with strong evidence for the existence of all
observable implications, an ideational change followed Mexico’s macroeconomic
crisis. The ideas underlying extant macroeconomic policy, focused on import
substitution industrialisation, had collapsed. Vast public expenditure by a populist
president, based on the belief that oil revenues could sustain rapid
industrialisation, led the country to the brink of bankruptcy. Research in the 1990s
showed that states with abundant resource wealth ironically tend to perform less
well economically than their resource hungry counterparts (Karl 1997; Ross
1999).
Table 3. The Identification of Ideational Change

The Observable Implications
Ideational Collapse
O1. Media critique the current policy paradigm and propose alternative ideas
O2. International organisations critique the current policy paradigm and propose
alternative ideas
O3. There is widespread public dissatisfaction with the current policy paradigm,
observable through opinion polls, protests etc.
O4. Academics, economists and civil servants critique the current policy
paradigm and propose alternative ideas
O5. Civil society organizations such as the labour unions, employer
organizations and consumer groups critique the current policy paradigm and
propose alternative ideas
O6. Opposition political parties critique the current policy paradigm and propose
alternative ideas
New Ideational Consolidation
O7. Clear alternative ideas developed by policy entrepreneurs
O8. Political entrepreneur combines interests to produce consensus around
replacement paradigm
O9. Political entrepreneur injects new ideas into the policy making arena
Adoption of New Idea

Mexico
1981-1983
SE
SE
SE
SE
SE
SE
SE
SE
SE
SE

Stage 3: Testing the Nature of Policy Change
On assuming office, De La Madrid adopted a crisis management approach to the
economy, declaring “we are in an emergency” in his inaugural address at the end
of 1982 (Russell, Bolte and Lopez 1982, 30). He quickly set out a 10 point
program of austerity measures – Programa Inmediato de Reordenacion
Economica (Program of Immediate Economic Reorganization) (Lustig1998).
Acting as a political entrepreneur, he appointed 11 new ministers from the
conservative wing of the PRI (Nelson 1990). Consequently, his cabinet supported
his measures to stabilize and open the economy – prioritising the attraction of
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foreign direct investment (FDI) and focusing on high tech industries (Aboites
1983; Lustig 1992). Macroeconomic stabilisation became the government’s
priority (Cornelius 1985; Pastor and Wise 1997). The first budget he sent to
Congress, seeking to reduce the budget deficit by 50 percent, was draconian
(Russell, Bolte and Lopez 1982). But, he intended to continue as he had begun
and the budgets introduced in 1983 and 1984 represented a sustained austerity
drive (Cornelius 1985). Under De La Madrid, economic policy lurched violently
to the right. As access to the president was crucial in influencing policy, policy
entrepreneurs cultivated teams of loyal followers within various bureaucracies
and departments of government (Golob 2003).
The peso was pegged at a more "realistic" exchange rate and plans were
introduced to restructure the federal bureaucracy. De La Madrid introduced
conventional monetary and fiscal austerity, and more extensive trade
liberalisation. For decades free trade had been “the policy option that dare not
speak its name” (Golob 2003, 370). The Mexican government also adopted a less
confrontational approach to the IMF and as a result was able to reach agreement
with the Fund on an adjustment program to revive the economy (Nelson 1990).
This agreement was hailed as a major break-through, allowing the country to
avoid a debt moratorium (ISG 1982; Looney 1985).
Recognising that the Mexican government and economy could not rely on
revenues from oil exports, De La Madrid saw the solution to financing the
country’s development in the privatisation of public enterprises, 1,155 of which
were sold off (Hernandez 2010). There was an effort to combine structural change
and macroeconomic stabilisation, with a focus on export orientated industries
(Cornelius 1985). Power was also decentralised to the 31 states to foster
competition between their governments and economies, and in so doing help
encourage the development of private industries and investment. The overall
objective was the integration of the Mexican economy into the global economy.
These policies were to have a long lasting impact upon Mexico’s
economic, and social, development (Cornelius 1985). The change from
“stabilising development” to neo-liberalism – marked by the government’s
embrace of liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation – was radical (Pastor and
Wise 1997). Mexico’s import substitutions policies had concentrated on
developing the internal market, while the new approach focused on international
forces as drivers of liberalisation (Middlebrook 2004). However, a major concern
was the inability of Mexican industries to compete in foreign markets, and the low
level of internal saving available to finance growth. The relaxation of restrictive
FDI laws was a clear signal of the government’s desire to attract foreign
industries to Mexico. In early 1984 new guidelines were issued specifying the
conditions under which majority foreign ownership of companies could be
permitted (Cornelius 1985). This development allowed Mexican businesses to
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begin forging relationships with foreign firms Tournaud (2008). All of these
reforms and cutbacks enabled Mexico reach its IMF targets for reducing the
public sector deficit and limiting new public sector external indebtedness.
Unfortunately, the recessionary impact of this strategy was very severe and much
of the work of economic adjustment was left to De La Madrid's successor (Pastor
and Wise 1997).
The result of these neo-liberal reforms was a transformation in the
relationship between state and private sector of the economy (Middlebrook 2004).
For decades the PRI had kept private sector interests at a distance, but now all that
changed (Golob 2003). As the development of the private sector became crucial
to the country’s economic revival, the growing importance of the private sector
gave it more influence over the formulation of economic policy and increased
access to the government. Under De La Madrid, all sections of society gained a
voice in a general movement of national liberalisation (Cárdenas 2009). The De
La Madrid administration recognised that economic revival had to be based upon
economic reality.
Mexican economic history can be divided into that which came before,
and that which came after, 1982 (Serra-Puche 2008). The crisis saw the
development of a new set of economic policies and a new approach to economic
management under De La Madrid. In the wake of the crisis, and the change in the
ideas underlying economic policy, Mexico experienced a third-order change in
macroeconomic policy. State control was replaced by the market, public
ownership was replaced by private ownership and protectionism was replaced by
competition (Lustig 2001; Pastor and Wise 1997). From 1982 onwards Mexican
economic policy started down a different path, culminating in its accession to
NAFTA in 1993 (Hernandez 2010). Table 4 shows that there is strong evidence
Mexico’s macroeconomic policy’s instruments settings, the instruments
themselves, and hierarchy of goals behind macroeconomic policy all changed
after 1982.
Table 4. The Identification of Change in Government Economic Policy
The Observable Implications
O1. Economic policy instrument settings changed
O2. The instruments of economic policy changed
O3. The hierarchy of goals behind economic policy changed
Critical Juncture in Macroeconomic Policy

Mexico
1981-1983
SE
SE
SE
SE

According to Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) critical juncture framework, this
third order policy change, occurring in the wake of an economic crisis and
ideational change, constitutes a critical juncture. These findings, by highlighting
http://www.psocommons.org/rhcpp
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that an economic crisis is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for radical policy
change, show the important role ideational change plays in the process of policy
change. The strength of the ideas underlying the import substitution policy
protected it and ensured its continuity in the years after 1945. However, by the
early 1980s, the policy was found to be failing, and the ideas supporting it were
undermined and collapsed. Thereafter, change agents, led by a political
entrepreneur in the form of President De La Madrid, consolidated around neoliberal ideas on how to manage the economy, resulting in a third-order change in
Mexican macroeconomic policy.

Conclusion
This paper examined the economic difficulties in Mexico in the early 1980s in
order to determine if there had been a critical juncture in that country’s economic
policies. To answer this question we employed Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) three
stage critical junctures theory with its attendant range of observable implications.
Using this policy change tool, we found strong evidence that the economic
malaise in Mexico (1981-1983) constituted an economic crisis. With the
economic viability of the state being questioned, import substitution and the
restrictions imposed upon FDI were perceived as failing policies. There is strong
evidence that the ideational foundations underlying extant economic policy
collapsed in the midst of the economic crisis. In response, change agents, led by a
political entrepreneur in the form of President De La Madrid, consolidated around
new set of ideas on how the manage the economy. These new ideas, involving a
180 degree reversal of previous policy thinking – opening the economy to free
trade and pursuing FDI – constituted ideational change. The evidence from our
findings suggests that the policies adopted in response to the crisis involved
altering the setting, instruments, and hierarchy of goals behind Mexican economic
policy – a third order policy change. Thus, we identified a crisis, ideational
change, and radical change in macroeconomic policy, which according to the
framework constitutes a critical juncture.
The early 1980s witnessed a dramatic shift in Mexican macroeconomic
policy. These policy changes, instituted by De La Madrid, were to serve as a
cornerstone for Mexican economic policy going forward. Mexico was
transformed from an inward to an outward looking economy, with a new outlook
on the world. This was to ultimately lead Mexico to reappraise its position both
locally and globally and in just over a decade see it join the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Since the early 1980s, and despite subsequent
economic crises, this overarching policy prescription has remained unaltered due
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to the recognition that protectionism did not work for Mexico and does not
constitute a viable alternative to a free market and free trade.
The critical juncture theory shows how established policies are protected
by the coherence of their underpinning ideas. However, during a crisis,
established policies and their underpinning ideas, having been weakened by
failure, can be overcome by political-entrepreneur-led change agents
consolidating around new ideas. In the critical junctures theory, the presence or
absence of ideational change differentiates between a crisis that is followed by a
radical policy change and one that is followed by policy changes of a less
dramatic nature. This is a theory capable of examining a range of policy change
issues and exploring the nature of that change in the wake of a crisis. As such, the
observables used here can easily be modified to examine changes in policies as
diverse as foreign policy, education policy and equality policy. The critical
juncture theory can help us to understand the impact of crises on policy making
and policy change.
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